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I. INTRODUCTION
2QHRIWKHFKLHILVVXHVLQWKHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQOHJDOUHJLPHLVWKHDGHTXDF\
RI ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ EHQHILWV1 Certainly, there are struggles over the costs to
HPSOR\HUVRISURYLGLQJZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQLQVXUDQFHIRUWKHFRYHUDJHRIZRUNSODFH
injuries, but those costs have been going down. 2 In general, workplaces have become safer,
1. For an entertaining introductory podcast see Alan S. Pierce, Are Workers’ Comp Benefits Adequate?,
LEGAL TALK NETWORK (Feb. 23, 2017), https://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/workers-compmatters/2017/02/workers-comp-benefits-adequate/.
2. Employer costs have fluctuated, rising during the Great Recession but recently declining to historically
low levels. See NAT¶L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., WORKERS¶ COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS
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which probably explains the decline.3 :KHQRQHVHHVZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQLQWKHQHZV
these days, it is most often in connection with scandalous fraud or outrageous, if sometimes
anecdotal, stories of under-compensation which generate allegations of unconstitutional
benefit inadequacy.4 7KHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ³*UDQG%DUJDLQ´RUTXLGSURTXR²the
H[FKDQJH RI FRPPRQ ODZ WRUW ULJKWV WR GDPDJHV DQG GHIHQVHV  IRU VWDWXWRU\ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation rights to benefits and tort immunity²was purportedly constitutionally
premised on a notion of rHDVRQDEOH ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ EHQHILWV5 Implicit in the
exchange was that some tort law beneficiaries (both defendants and plaintiffs) were giving
up, ex ante, what would have matured into ascertainable tort damages (or defenses). 6 Other
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQsation statutory beneficiaries would receive windfalls as the victims of
pure accident (claimants) or as the perpetrators of negligent harms (employers).
Nevertheless, the question of benefit adequacy is important to those directly impacted by
injury and can assume heightened societal importance whenever it is proposed that
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQSULQFLSOHVEHH[SRUWHGWRRWKHUOHJDOHQYLURQPHQWV± for example,
to the medical malpractice tort regime. 7
,Q WKH 5DZOVLDQ VHQVH WKH ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ FRPSURPLse was worked out
behind a veil of ignorance because no one could know, in advance, the identities of future
winners and losers under the new law.8 Still, no one could have doubted the fact that there
would be winners and losers. Possession of a tort right was, and is, mere potentiality until
WKHULJKWLVH[HUFLVHGDQGVSHDNLQJDERXW³H[FKDQJHV´RIULJKWVLQWKHDEVWUDFWLVDZNZDUG
<HWH[FKDQJHVRIHQWLUHFDWHJRULHVRIULJKWVLVKRZWKHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQTXLGSUR
quo is typically conceived,9 and this article will continue to speak within that framework.
(2017),
https://www.nasi.org/research/2017/report-workers%E2%80%99-compensation-benefits-coveragecosts-%E2%80%93-2015.
3. See Louise Esola, Comp Rates Set to Continue Downward Trend in 2018, BUS. INS. (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20171011/NEWS08/912316461/Workers-compensation-rates-setto-continue-downward-trend-in-2018. The reader will note the discrepancy between falling carrier rates and
rising employer costs. A full discussion of the phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article but has very
LQWHUHVWLQJLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHIXWXUHRIZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ
4. See Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 4, 2015),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-demolition-of-workers-compensation (highlighting benefit inadequacy
through statistics and case studies). There are exceptions, however. See Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes,
Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 14, 2015),
https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-comp (featuring corporate
DWWHPSWVWRHOLPLQDWHVWDWXWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWVWRSURYLGHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQEHQHILWV 
5. See infra Part II.
6. This problem was dealt with in a view very early compensation statutes by allowing an employee to elect
DQHJOLJHQFHDFWLRQZKHUHDQLQMXU\KDGREYLRXVO\UHVXOWHGIURPDQHPSOR\HU¶Vpersonal negligence. See, e.g.,
Providing Compensation for Persons Injured in Certain Hazardous Industries 1911 Kans. Sess. Laws 382, § 2.
But this approach was very quickly dispensed with as statutes continued to be enacted in the 1910s. See U.S.
DEP¶T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKMEN¶S COMP. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES AND
FOREIGN COUNTRIES, Bulletin No. 203 (1917 >KHUHLQDIWHU³U.S. DEP¶T OF LABOR´@
7. See generally Alexander Volokh, Medical Malpractice as Workers’ Comp: Overcoming State
Constitutional Barriers to Tort Reform, 67 EMORY L. J. 975 (2018).
8. See Original Position, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 4±7 (2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/original-position/.
9. For a recent example, see Johnson v. U.S. Food Service, No. 117,725, slip op. 116483 (Kan. Ct. App.
Aug. 3, 2018), http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/CtApp/2018/20180803/117725.pdf
VWULNLQJRQLWVIDFHVHFWLRQRI.DQVDVZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVWDWXWHFDOFXODWLQJSDUWLDOEHQHILWVLQDPDQQHU
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7KH IRFXV RI WKLV DUWLFOH LV SULPDULO\ OLPLWHG WR H[SORULQJ KRZ WKH ZRUNHUV¶
compensation founders thought about benefit adequacy rather than assessing whether
present benefits are in fact adequate. But WKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ
benefits were originally reasonable often becomes intertwined with assessments of their
FXUUHQW UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RU DGHTXDF\ $V PHQWLRQHG XQGHU WKH RULJLQDO ZRUNHUV¶
compensation bargain, employees who might have been bona fide tort victims were limited
WRZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQEHQHILWVERWKLQGHPQLW\SD\PHQWVIRUORVWZDJHVDQGSD\PHQW
for medical expenses10 resulting from work-related injuries. One measure of the
UHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQEHQHIits might therefore be the extent to which
they corresponded (or continue to correspond) to the expected value of foregone tort
damages. The problem with this measure is that most negligence cases are imperfect; they
will yield something less than the theoretical maximum value of a given claim. 11 In
addition to complications associated with calculating the expected values of specific
litigated cases, there are valuation problems across legal epochs. As jurisdictions have
dispensed with all-or-nothing negligence defenses²contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk, 12 part of13 WKH³XQKRO\WULQLW\´DIILUPDWLYH-defense-death-knell of
many work injuries under the old tort regime 14²the original valuation of cases across a
range of possible values has probably FKDQJHG7KH³YDOXH´RIDWRUWFODLPVKRXOGSUREDEO\
ULVH DUJXDEO\ QHFHVVLWDWLQJ D ³UHRSHQHU´ RI WKH TXLG SUR TXR15 In a similar vein, the
FRQFHSWRIDQ³DFFLGHQW´PD\DOVRFKDQJHRYHUWLPHDVWKHLGHDRIIRUHVHHDELOLW\FKDQJHV
Accidents (and plaintiffs) in the 21st century may be foreseeable in a way that would not
have been possible in the early twentieth century, 16 ZKHQZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVWDWXWHV
originated. On the other hand, cumulative, or gradual, injuries of a kind probably not under
contemplation at the time of the original quid pro quo, but sometimes covered under the
FXUUHQW ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ UHJLPH17 would be difficult to conceive under a
likely to produce lower benefits in violation of the quid pro quo under Kansas law).
10. Though in the very earliest statutes some states did not provide for payment of medical expense at all,
some states provided only very limited medical benefits (more like first aid) for a short period of time
immediately following a work-related injury a maximum of perhaps 60 days, some states paid medical benefits
only in the case of the death of the injured worker, and in all cases where medical benefits were paid they were
strictly capped. See HARRY B. BRADBURY, WORKMEN¶S COMPENSATION AND STATE INSURANCE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 190±205 (1912).
11. ³$FFRUGLQJWRWKHPRGHOWKHYDOXHRIDODZVXLWLVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIWKHSODLQWLIIV¶YLFWRU\PXOWLSOLHGE\
WKH DPRXQW WR EH ZRQ PLQXV WUDQVDFWLRQ FRVWV´ -RKQ %URQVWHLQ Some Thoughts About the Economics of
Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1129, 1137 (2009). See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits with Negative
Expected Value, Faculty Discussion Paper No. 256, Harv. Center for L. & Econ. (1997), in 3 The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law 551±54 (1998), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/Negati
ve-Expected-Value-Suit.pdf.
12. See Marianne M. Jennings, The Impact of Alternative Negligence Defense Rules on Litigation Behavior
and Tort Claim Disposition, 5 BYU J. PUB. L. 33 (1991).
13. The third such defense was the fellow-servant rule²the employer was not vicariously liable to an
employee for the negligence of a co-employee.
14. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526±27 (4th ed. 1971).
15. See Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014) (dismissed
on procedural grounds) (trial judge arguing reopener theory).
16. See Meiring de Villiers, Foreseeability Decoded, 16 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 343, 344±45 (2015)
(discussing changing notions of foreseeability as technology and scientific knowledge advance).
17. Carpal tunnel syndrome is a good example. See generally 4 LARSON¶S WORKERS¶ COMPENSATION LAW
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foreseeability-based tort regime. 18 $Q\ UHFRQILJXUDWLRQ RI WKH ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ
structure taking these modern variables into account would doubtless require mindbogglingly complex actuarial assessment. In any event, as some plaintiffs have been
arguing,19 given the immense shift represented by the establishment of a comparative
negligence regime, it is plausible that employees would never have agreed to the tradeoff. 20
Nevertheless, with respect to the victims of pure accident, the same conversation is
inapt. Because these victims would not have been compensated under the tort regime of
1911,21 LWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRSHUVXDVLYHO\DUJXHWKDWDQ\OHYHORIZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ
EHQHILWV LV ³OHJDOO\´ XQUHDVRQDEOH )RU WKLV FDWHJRU\ RI HPSOR\HHV ZRUNHUV¶
compensation, almost by definition, functions as a form of social insurance. 22 Although
WKLV DZNZDUG FRQIODWLRQ RI EHQHILFLDULHV LV XELTXLWRXV WKH ZD\ LW LPSDFWV ZRUNHUV¶
compensation policy discussions is usually not acknowledged.
Social insurance analyses of benefit adequacy often frankly admit the absence of
consensus on the meaning of benefit inadequacy. 23 Social insurance analysts also
UHFRJQL]HWKHSDXFLW\RIUDZGDWDUHODWLQJWRZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQEHQHILWVLQWKH8QLWHG
States that is easily accessible to academic researchers. Over the last thirty years, for
example, it appears that few comparative empirical studies of benefit levels have been
completed by only a handful of academic social science researchers. 24 Despite this
shortcoming, in the evolution of wRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ EHQHILWV PDMRU FRPSHWLQJ

§ 50.01.
18. See generally 2YHUVHDV7DQNVKLS 8. /WGY0RUWV'RFNDQG(QJ¶J&R/WG :DJRQ Mound No. 1)
[1961] UKPC 1, [1961] AC 388, [1961] 1 All ER 404 (Jan. 18, 1961) (holding tort damages not available in
absence of foreseeability of type of damage plaintiff suffered). That cumulative injuries were not contemplated
is suggested by the very OLPLWHG GXUDWLRQ RI PHGLFDO FDUH SURYLGHG XQGHU WKH HDUOLHVW $PHULFDQ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation statutes. See generally infra Part III.
19. See %ULHIIRU3ODLQWLII9DVTXH]Y'LOODUG¶V ,QF3G 2NOD  1R :/
6277356; Brief for Petitioner, Stahl v. Hialeah Hosp., 182 So.3d 635 (Fla. 2015) (No. SC15-725), 2015 WL
6951096.
20. Assuming one believes there was ever truly broad employee assent. Scholars have persuasively made the
FDVHWKDWLQVWDOODWLRQRIWKHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQUHJime represented a multilateral agreement between various
stakeholders. See generally PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE
STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS¶ COMPENSATION (2000). Unions were weak²union density was roughly
5.5% in 1910²roughly 2 million workers out of a working population of 38 million were union members. See
LEO WOLMAN, UNION MEMBERSHIP IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Bulletin 68 (1937), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5410.pdf ). Leaders of organized
ODERU WKHQ YROXQWDULVW LQVWLQFWLYHO\ RSSRVHG VRFLDO LQVXUDQFH DQG RQO\ JUXGJLQJO\ DFFHSWHG ZRUNHUV¶
compensation because they felt it could not be properly negotiated²as they argued it should be²within
collective bargaining agreements. See generally Robert Asher, The Ignored Precedent: Samuel Gompers and
Workers’ Compensation, 4 NEW LAB. REV. 51 (1982).
21. 7KH\HDUWKDWFRPSUHKHQVLYHVWDWHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\stems were first enacted. See generally infra
Part III.
22. )RUWKLVUHDVRQLWVHHPVWHFKQLFDOO\LQDFFXUDWHWRUHIHUWRZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQgenerally as a form of
social insurance. See H. ALLAN HUNT & MARCUS DILLENDER, W.E. UPJOHN INST. FOR EMP¶T RESEARCH,
WORKERS¶
COMPENSATION,
ANALYSIS
FOR
ITS
SECOND
CENTURY
(2017),
http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1262&context=up_press.
23. H. ALLAN HUNT, NAT¶L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., ADEQUACY OF EARNINGS REPLACEMENT IN WORKERS¶
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: A REPORT OF THE STUDY PANEL ON BENEFIT ADEQUACY OF THE WORKERS¶
COMPENSATION STEERING COMMITTEE 19±23 (2004).
24. For a review of the existing studies, see HUNT & DILLENDER, supra note 22, at 5±30.
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theories of benefit adequacy have emerged. 25 The study and articulation of these theories
is important; but the present inquiry is more narrowly focused. In this article, the inquiry
will be what early architecWVRIZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVWDWXWHVPHDQWE\EHQHILWDGHTXDF\
While society is not necessarily bound by what those architects thought, understanding
ZKDWWKHHVVHQWLDOZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVRFLDOFRQWUDFWZDVRQFHXQGHUVWRRGWRPHDQ
should inform present discussions of benefit adequacy. 26
The difficulty with such an inquiry, however, is that early American courts made
few attempts to explain why workers compensation benefit levels, purportedly established
as a quid pro quo for tort damages, were reasonable. Part II of this article analyzes some
of the decisions issued by those early courts, and highlights language from the decisions
VKRZLQJ WKDW WKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ EHQHILWV WKHQ XQGHU
consideration was presumed but never explained. Part III of the article explores early
$PHULFDQ ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ SROLF\ DQDO\VHV E\ YDULRXV SULYDWH DQG SXEOLF-sector
stakeholders²beginning in 1909²that were inspired by an investigative team sponsored
by the Russell Sage Foundation,27 and initiated b\ WKH 0LQQHVRWD (PSOR\HHV¶
Compensation Commission.28 7KRVH LQYHVWLJDWRUV VWXGLHG (XURSHDQ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation systems, some of which had already been substantially in place for a quarterFHQWXU\ SULRU WR WKH HQDFWPHQW RI WKH ILUVW $PHULFDQ ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHnsation statutes in
1910-1911.29 A second similar investigation and analysis was conducted roughly two years
later by the National Association of Manufacturers. 30 This article concludes31 that already
H[LVWLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPVHVSHcially the German and English
systems, and close American expert policy scrutiny of those systems, persuaded the U.S.
6XSUHPH&RXUWWR³GHIHU´RQWKHTXHVWLRQRIHPSOR\HHEHQHILWOHYHOVZLWKRXWGLVFXVVLRQ
WRH[SHUWVLQYROYHGLQFUHDWLRQRI1HZ<RUN¶VVHFRQGDWWHPSWDWDZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ
act32 during the height of the Lochner era.33 In retrospect, the Court may have been
extending its conceptions of state police power to allow for a form of rational basis review
of industry-FRQVHQVXDO UHVROXWLRQ RI D ³WHFKQLFDO´ SUREOHP34 From the perspective of
25. HUNT, supra note 23, at 19±23.
26. On reimagining the social contract, see generally Josh Friedman and Michael Lind, The Past and Future
of America’s Social Contract, ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/12
/the-past-and-future-of-americas-social-contract/282511/.
27. LEE K. FRANKEL & MILES M. DAWSON, WORKINGMEN¶S INSURANCE IN EUROPE (1910),
https://www.russellsage.org/sites/default/files/Frankel.Dawson.Dublin_Workingmen_0.pdf.
28. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN¶S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENTS, Atlantic City, New Jersey (1909).
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See David A. Strauss, Why was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 374 (2003) (discussing a
common view that the U.S. Supreme Court, as reflected in Lochner v. New York³WUHDWHGULJKWVGHILQHGE\WKH
FRPPRQODZRIFRQWUDFWVDVFRQVWLWXWLQJDQDWXUDOµSUH-SROLWLFDO¶VWDWHRIDIIDLUVDQGUHIXVHGWRUHFRJQL]HWKDW
those rights are as much the product of state action aVWKHUHJXODWRU\VWDWXWHVWKH&RXUWZDVLQYDOLGDWLQJ´ 7KH
Court decided Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, in 1905, yet the 1917±ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQGHFLVLRQVVHHPTXLWH
willing to interfere with private contracts between employers and employees. See generally infra Part II.
34. )RU GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH HYROXWLRQ RI ³SROLFH SRZHU´ UDWLRQDOLW\ UHYLHZ VHH 7KRPDV % 1DFKEDU The
Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1640±41 (2016).
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HPSOR\HH EHQHILWV WKH &RXUW LWVHOI GHFOLQHG WR DUWLFXODWH DQ\ VSHFLILF ZRUNHUV¶
FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDQGDUGV QHFHVVDU\ WR PDLQWDLQ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ RI WKH ZRUNHUV¶
compensation system under the United States Constitution. At most, the Court suggested
the existence of a benefit floor, and held that the statutes it was reviewing had not fallen
beneath that floor.
II. BENEFIT ADEQUACY AS REASONABLENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE
IMPLICATION
In the early part of the 20th century, in response to an epidemic of workplace injuries
occasioned by the intensifying industrial revolution, 35 states began to experiment with
VXSSODQWLQJ WRUW ODZ ZLWK ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ ODZ 7KH H[SHULPHQW ZDV QRW QHZ 36
Similar developments had been unfolding in Europe since about 1875.37 This Part
GLVFXVVHVFRXUWFKDOOHQJHVWRWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQLQWKH8QLWHG
States.
A. From Ives to White
In Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co.,38 the New York Court of Appeals struck as
unFRQVWLWXWLRQDODQHDUO\1HZ<RUNZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVWDWXWH 39 While not quibbling
with the police power authority of the state to correct social evils, 40 the Court found that,
by imposing upon employers liability without fault for employee workplace injuries, the
VWDWXWH³SODLQO\FRQVWLWXWH>HG@DGHSULYDWLRQRIOLEHUW\DQGSURSHUW\XQGHUWKHIHGHUDODQG
state Constitutions . . ´41 $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH &RXUW ³µ3URFHVV RI ODZ¶ LQ LWV EURDG VHQVH
means law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice, and that is but
DQRWKHUZD\RIVD\LQJWKDWHYHU\PDQ¶VULJKWWROLIHOLEHUW\DQGSURSHUW\LVWREHGLVSRVHG
of in accordance with those ancient and fundamental principles which were in existence
ZKHQRXU&RQVWLWXWLRQVZHUHDGRSWHG´42 Thus, Ives SUHVXPHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRI³DQFLHQW
DQGIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHV´SUHGDWLQJWKH86DQG1HZ<RUNFRQVWLWXWLRQVDQGDSSHDUHG
to assume that the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution incorporated those principles
LQ WKH IRUPXOD ³GXH SURFHVV RI ODZ´43 The day after Ives was decided, the infamous
Triangle Shirt Waist fire killed approximately one-hundred and fifty workers in New York
City.44 The publicity in connection with the fire is often regarded as a significant
35. Mark Aldrich, History of Workplace Safety in the United States, 1880-1970, EH.NET,
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-workplace-safety-in-the-united-states-1880-1970-2/.
36. See infra Part III.
37. FRANKEL AND DAWSON, WORKINGMEN¶S INSURANCE IN EUROPE 74 (discussing partial implementation
LQRIZRUNHUV¶compensation principles applicable to railway and steamship companies in Switzerland).
38. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
39. ,Q  1HZ <RUN SDVVHG WZR ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWHV D YROXQWDU\ VWDWXWH DSSOLFDEOH WR DOO
employments and a compulsory statute applicable only to ultra-hazardous employment. FISHBACK & KANTOR,
supra note 20, at 96. It was obviously the compulsory statute that was contentious.
40. Ives, 94 N.E. at 437.
41. Id. at 439.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. PETER M. LENCIS, WORKERS¶&OMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 12 (1998).
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motivating factor for subsequent amendment of the New York Constitution to allow for
HQDFWPHQW RI D VHFRQG ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWH45 The constitutional amendment
provided in relevant part:
Nothing contained in this constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the
legislature to enact laws . . . for the payment . . . of compensation for injuries to
employees or for death of employees resulting from such injuries without regard to
fault as a cause thereof . . . or to provide that the right of such compensation, and
the remedy therefor shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies for injuries
to employees or for death resulting from such injuries. 46
Thus, the state law constitutional basis for Ives¶ LQYDOLGDWLRQ RI WKH 1HZ <RUN
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQDFWZDVUHPRYHGZKLOHIHGHUal constitutional questions had yet to
be resolved.
The impact of Ives throughout the United States was significant. Seven states,
LQFOXGLQJ1HZ<RUN³ZHQWVRIDUDVWRDPHQGWKHLUFRQVWLWXWLRQVWRPDNHXQTXHVWLRQDEO\
certain that compensation legislation ZRXOG EH OHJDO´47 In 1911, several states were
DOUHDG\ GUDIWLQJ ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWHV DQG QLQH RI WKHP LQ UHDFWLRQ WR Ives,
decided to create non-compulsory laws permitting employers to elect whether to
SDUWLFLSDWHLQZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHms.48 While some commentators have believed
that Ives did not in reality represent the majority of legal and judicial opinion at the time,
1HZ <RUN¶V FRXUW RI ODVW UHVRUW QHYHUWKHOHVV H[HUWHG VXEVWDQWLDO LQIOXHQFH RYHU VWDWH
legislatures.49
Whereas Ives had been employer-centric in its focus²discussing almost exclusively
ZKHWKHUDVWDWHKDGWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSRZHUWRELQGHPSOR\HUVWRFRPSXOVRU\ZRUNHUV¶
compensation laws² WKHVHFRQGPDMRUZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFDVHDULVLQJ
in New York, New York Cent. R. Co. v. White,50 discussed the common-law rights of both
employers and employees.51 7KH HPSOR\HU DSSHDOHG WKH XQGHUO\LQJ ZRUNHUV¶
45. Id. at 12; HERMAN MILES SOMERS AND ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN¶S COMPENSATION,
PREVENTION, INSURANCE AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 32 (1954).
46. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, Art. 1, § 19 (1914).
47. SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 45, at 32. The states were Arizona, California, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id. at 32 n.26.
48. Id. at 32.
49. Id. at 32 Q %HWZHHQ  DQG  ZKHQ WKH 86 6XSUHPH &RXUW XSKHOG FRPSXOVRU\ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation statutes in N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), see infra at n.50 and accompanying
text, the following states enacted elective, rather than compulsory, statutes: Kansas (1911), Massachusetts (1911),
New Hampshire (1911), New Jersey (1911), Wisconsin (1911), Michigan (1912), Rhode Island (1912),
Connecticut (1913), Iowa (1913), Minnesota (1913), Nebraska (1913), Nevada (1913), Oregon (1913), Texas
(1913), West Virginia (1913), Louisiana (1914), Kentucky (1914), Colorado (1915), Indiana (1915), Maine
(1915), Montana (1915), Pennsylvania (1915), Vermont (1915), Delaware (1917), and South Dakota 1917. After
1917, the eight states enacting elective statutes were located in the South: Virginia (1918), Alabama (1919),
Tennessee (1919), Missouri (1919), Georgia (1920), North Carolina (1929), Florida (1935), and South Carolina
(1935). FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 20, at 103±04 tbl. 4.3. Of these states, only Texas remains elective.
50. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). The administrative decision below affirming tKHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQDZDUGRI
benefits was upheld in the New York appellate courts without opinion in light of the intervening amendment of
the state constitution and the subsequent upholding of the Act under the amended constitution in Jensen v.
Southern Pac. Co. 109 N.E. 600 (N.Y. 1915), rev’d on other grounds, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
51. 7KHUDLOURDGDSSHDOHGRQWKHWKHRULHVWKDWOLDELOLW\ZDVH[FOXVLYHO\JRYHUQHGE\WKH)HGHUDO(PSOR\HUV¶
/LDELOLW\$FWDQGWKDWWKHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQDZDUG³ZRXOGGHprive plaintiff in error of its property without
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compensation award, rendered in favor of the family of a deceased employee, 52 on much
the same grounds as had been the case in Ives.53 On this occasion, however, the issues were
purely federal and decided by the United States Supreme Court rather than the New York
Court of Appeals.54 Just as the New York courts had in Ives, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the involved empOR\HUV¶ SURSHUW\ ULJKWV55 But the Supreme Court also
DQDO\]HGWKHTXHVWLRQRIGHSULYDWLRQRIHPSOR\HHWRUWUHPHGLHVLQH[FKDQJHIRUZRUNHUV¶
FRPSHQVDWLRQEHQHILWV7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWQRWHGWKDWLWKDGDOUHDG\³XSKHOGWKHDXWKRULW\
of the states to establish by legislation departures from the fellow-servant rule and other
common-ODZ UXOHV DIIHFWLQJ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V OLDELOLW\ IRU SHUVRQDO LQMXULHV WR WKH
HPSOR\HH´56 Such departures, while justified, were limited,57 and it was unnecessary
for the purposes of the present case, to say that a state might, without violence to
WKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOJXDUDQW\RIµGXHSURFHVVRIODZ¶VXGGHQO\VHWDVLGHDOOFRPPRQlaw rules respecting liability as between employer and employee, without providing
a reasonably just substitute. Considering the vast industrial organization of the state
of New York, for instance, with hundreds of thousands of plants and millions of
wage earners, each employer, on the one hand, having embarked his capital, and
each employee, on the other, having taken up his particular mode of earning a
livelihood, in reliance upon the probable permanence of an established body of law
governing the relation, it perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish
all rights of action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting
up something adequate in their stead. No such question is here presented, and we
intimate no opinion upon it.58
GXHSURFHVVRIODZDQGGHQ\WRLWWKHHTXDOSURWHFWLRQRIWKHODZVLQFRQWUDYHQWLRQRIWKHWK$PHQGPHQW´
White, 243 U.S. at 191. With respect to employees, the Court said,
In considering the constitutional question, it is necessary to view the matter from the standpoint of
the employee as well as from that of the employer. For, while plaintiff in error is an employer, and
cannot succeed without showing that its rights as such are infringed . . . yet . . . the exemption from
further liability is an essential part of the scheme, so that the statute, if invalid as against the employee,
is invalid as against the employer.
Id. at 197 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 191.
53. Id.; see supra notes 38±39 and accompanying text.
54. White, 243 U.S. at 196±97.
The scheme of the act is so wide a departure from common-law standards respecting the responsibility
of employer to employee that doubts naturally have been raised respecting its constitutional validity.
The adverse considerations urged or suggested in this case and in kindred cases submitted at the same
WLPHDUH D 7KDWWKHHPSOR\HU¶VSURSHUW\LVWDNHQZLWKRXWGXHSURFHVVRIODZEHFDXVHKHLVVXEMHFWHG
to a liability for compensation without regard to any neglect or default on his part or on the part of
any other person for whom he is responsible, and in spite of the fact that the injury may be solely
DWWULEXWDEOHWRWKHIDXOWRIWKHHPSOR\HH E WKDWWKHHPSOR\HH¶VULJKWVDUHLQWHUIHUHGZLWKLQWKDWKH
iVSUHYHQWHGIURPKDYLQJFRPSHQVDWLRQIRULQMXULHVDULVLQJIURPWKHHPSOR\HU¶VIDXOWFRPPHQVXUDWH
with the damages actually sustained, and is limited to the measure of compensation prescribed by the
act; and (c) that both employer and employee are deprived of their liberty to acquire property by being
prevented from making such agreement as they choose respecting the terms of the employment.
Id.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
Id. (emphasis added). The implication is that the New York system then before the Supreme Court was
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For the Court, no such question was presented because
it is not unreasonable for the state, while relieving the employer from responsibility
for damages measured by common-law standards and payable in cases where he or
those for whose conduct he is answerable are found to be at fault, to require him to
contribute a reasonable amount, and according to a reasonable and definite scale,
by way of compensation for the loss of earning power incurred in the common
enterprise, irrespective of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire
loss to rest where it may chance to fall, that is, upon the injured employee or his
dependents. Nor can it be deemed arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint
RIWKHHPSOR\HH¶VLQWHUHVWWRVXSSODQWDV\VWHPXQGHUZKLFKKHDVVXPHGWKHHQWLUH
risk of injury in ordinary cases, and in others had a right to recover an amount more
or less speculative upon proving facts of negligence that often were difficult to
prove, and substitute a system under which, in all ordinary cases of accidental
injury, he is sure of a definite and easily ascertained compensation, not being
obliged to assume the entire loss in any case, but in all cases assuming any loss
beyond the prescribed scale.59
None of this was to say,
that any scale of compensation, however insignificant, on the one hand,
or onerous, on the other, would be supportable. In this case, no criticism
is made on the ground that the compensation prescribed by the statute in
question is unreasonable in amount, either in general or in the particular
case. Any question of that kind may be met when it arises. 60
One especially underappreciated aspect of White LVLWVFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRIWKHVWDWH¶V
LQWHUHVW LQ SUHVHUYDWLRQ RI ³SHUVRQDO VHFXULW\´ $JDLQVW WKH HPSOR\HUV¶ DUJXPHQWV
respecting their interests, grounded in property and contract, the Court stated the
following:
The subject matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is the matter
of compensation for human life or limb lost or disability incurred in the course of
hazardous employment, and the public has a direct interest in this as affecting the
FRPPRQZHOIDUHµ7KHZhole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when
the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must
VXIIHU¶,WFDQQRWEHGRXEWHGWKDWWKHVWDWHPD\SURKLELWDQGSXQLVKVHOI-maiming
and attempts at suicide; it may prohibit a man from bartering away his life or his
personal security; indeed, the right to these is often declared, in bills of rights, to
be ‘natural and inalienable;’ and the authority to prohibit contracts made in
derogation of a lawfully-established policy of the state respecting compensation for
accidental death or disabling personal injury is equally clear. 61
Thus, the Supreme Court described life and personal security as inalienable rights
that a state could justifiably prioritize over rights of contract and property depending on
the circumstances. This emphasis on inalienability, when read in proper context, explained
clearly adequate.
59. White, 243 U.S. at 203±04.
60. Id. at 205.
61. Id. at 206±07 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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why the state could prohibit contracts that would waive rights to any remedy for personal
injury.
B. Murky Judicial Negative Implications Not Clarified
White has never been overruled,62 but has often been understood in terms of what it
claimed not to be saying. It represents, in other words, a species of negative pregnant
propositions, or rather a series of them $ QHJDWLYH SUHJQDQW LV D ³GHQLDO LPSO\LQJ LWV
affirmative opposite by seeming to deny only a qualification of the allegation and not the
DOOHJDWLRQLWVHOI´63 White’s negative pregnants included the following:
x

x

x

It is unnecessary to say that a state might (without triggering due process
concerns) set aside all rules of employer-employee liability ³without providing
a reasonably just substitute.´64
³[I]t perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish all rights of
action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up
something adequate in their stead.´65
³None of this was to say, that any scale of compensation, however insignificant,
on the one hand, or onerous, on the other, would be supportable.´66

7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWDSSDUHQWO\GHQLHGWKDWDQ³XQUHDVRQDEO\´XQMXVWLQDGHTXDWHRU
sufficiently insignificant remedy was provided under the New York statute, but implicit in
the denial was the affirmative opposite of the proposition. If, generally, a substitute remedy
was unjust, or inadequate, or insignificant then WKH VWDWH¶V DFWLRQV PLJKW YLRODWH GXH
process, be subject to doubt, or be insupportable.
The problem, of course, is how to interpret such statements now given the evolution
of constitutional doctrine. When White has been mentioned in modern quid pro quo theory
cases,67 IRUH[DPSOHLQWZR³3URWHFWLRQRI/DZIXO&RPPHUFHLQ$UPV$FW´FDVHV 68 the
usual response by courts is to say that it is not clear that a quid pro quo for deprivation of
tort rights is constitutionally required but, even if it is, the statute in question provides
adequate substitute tort remedies.69 That reasoning is circular without a baseline, however,
and in the absence of defining adequacy such utterances are conclusory. Courts might, of
course, simply say that White is archaic and should be abandoned; but they do not seem
quite willing to do so. The problem with simply abandoning White LQ ZRUNHUV¶
62. The due process-quid pro quo principle White appears to stand for remains an arguably open question at
WKH866XSUHPH&RXUW1RWPXFKVHHPVWRKDYHFKDQJHGVLQFHWKH&RXUW¶VGHFision in Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (White, J., dissenting), where Justice White made this claim. Indeed, that is
largely the point of this article.
63. Negative Pregnant, BLACK¶S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
64. See White, 243 U.S. at 201.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
67. As of this writing, research revealed five such cases: Ileto v. Glock, Inc. 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009);
Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F.Supp. 40 (W.D. Tenn. 1940); Lash v. State, 14 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 1943);
Lash v. State, 14 So. 2d 235 (Ala. Ct. $SS *LOODQGY6SRUWVPHQ¶V2XWSRVW,QF:/ &RQQ
Super. Ct. May 2011).
68. See Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1126; Gilland, WL 2479693 No. X04-CV-0950327655.
69. This was precisely the approach taken in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438
U.S. 59, 88, n.32 (1978).
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compensation contexts is that it is often regarded as the Rosetta Stone to original
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ ZULW ODUJH 2Q VRPH OHYHO LW KDV
always seemed to offend legal sensibilities to agree that a legislature could establish any
substantive parameters it wished.70 The proposition leads too easily to the possibility that
a state legislature could eliminate injury remedies altogether. This is simply another face
of the perennial tort reform debate on constitutional boundaries,71 and it is natural to read
White as forestalling such an outcome. One has difficulty reading White without receiving
the strong impression that the Supreme Court conditioned the quid pro quo on the
availability of adequate or reasonable substitute remedies.
In a case nearly contemporaneous with White, and again arising in the context of
hazardous employment, Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington,72 the Court took up
the question of employee benefits, though, as in White, it was the employer who had raised
the question of the constitutionality of the statute.73
[W]hile plaintiff in error is an employer, and cannot succeed without showing that
its constitutional rights as employer are infringed . . . yet it is evident that the
HPSOR\HU¶V H[HPSWLRQ IURP OLDELOLW\ WR SULYDWH DFWLRQ LV DQ HVVHQWLDO SDUW RI WKH
legislative scheme and the quid pro quo for the burdens imposed upon him, so that
if the act is not valid as against employees, it is not valid as against employers . . .
However, so far as the interests of employees and their dependents are concerned,
this act is not distinguishable in any point raising a constitutional difficulty from
WKH1HZ<RUN:RUNPHQ¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQ$FWVXVWDLQHGLQ>White].74
Thus, the two 1917 foundatLRQDO FDVHV XSKROGLQJ FRPSXOVRU\ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation systems, as applied to hazardous employment, offered little indication of
how reasonableness or adequacy was to be assessed apart from vaguely approving as
adequate the statutory structure then under consideration.75 It is perhaps surprising that the
&RXUW ERWKHUHG WR MXVWLI\ VWDWH ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWHV DW DOO IRU FRXUWV KDG
repeatedly pointed out that no one had a vested right in a rule of the common law. 76 Yet,
the question of reasonableness to employees was nevertheless addressed in Mountain

70. See T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism, 44
&DPEULGJH/-   GLVWLQJXLVKLQJOHJLVODWLYHVXSUHPDF\IURP³WKHUXOHRIODZ´ 
71. See generally Volokh, supra note 7.
72. 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
73. Id. at 227±28.
74. Id. at 234 (citations omitted). In fact, the employee benefits available under the Washington statute
differed substantially from those available under the New York statute.
75. The originDO1HZ<RUN:RUNHUV¶&RPSHQVDWLRQ$FWSURYLGHGLQ6HFWLRQ D DGHDWKEHQHILWRI
times the daily earnings capped at $3000; 50% of the average weekly wage if totally incapacitated and if partially
incapacitated in the case of partial incapacity the weekly payment shall in no case exceed the difference between
the amount of the average weekly earnings of the workman before the accident and the average weekly amount
which he is earning or is able to earn in the same employment or otherwise after the accident, but shall amount
to one-KDOIRIVXFKGLIIHUHQFH³,QQRHYHQWVKDOODQ\FRPSHQVDWLRQSDLGXQGHUWKLVDUWLFOHH[FHHGWKHGDPDJH
suffered, nor shall any weekly payment payable under this article in any event exceed ten dollars a week or
extend over PRUHWKDQHLJKW\HDUVIURPWKHGDWHRIWKHDFFLGHQW´1</DZV±49.
76. Munn v. Ill.86   ³$SHUVRQKDVQRSURSHUW\QRYHVWHGLQWHUHVWLQDQ\UXOHRIWKH
FRPPRQODZ´ )RUDQH[KDXVWLYHGLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVSRLQWVHHJohn C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of
Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005).
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Timber and White virtually sua sponte.77
,W LV SRVVLEOH WR UHDG WZR FDVHV IURP WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V  WHUP New York
Central R.R. Co. v. Bianc,78 and Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer,79 as both endorsing and
restricting a muscular legislative supremacy welded to federalism. In Bianc,80 the Court
FRQFOXGHGWKDWDVWDWHFRXOG DZDUG ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQEHQHILWV IRUIDFLDORUERGLO\
GLVILJXUHPHQW HYHQ ZKHUH QR LPSDFW RQ DQ HPSOR\HH¶V HDUQLQJ FDSDFLW\ KDG EHHQ
established.81 1RWLQJWKDW³DVHULRXVGLVILJXUHPHQWRIWKHIDFHRUKHDGUHDVRQDEO\PD\EH
UHJDUGHGDVKDYLQJDGLUHFWUHODWLRQWRWKHLQMXUHGSHUVRQ¶VHDUQLQJSRZHULUUHVSHFWLYHRI
LWVHIIHFWXSRQKLVPHUHFDSDFLW\IRUZRUN´ 82 the Court said,
If a state recognizes or establishes a right of action for compensation to injured
workmen upon grounds not arbitrary or fundamentally unjust, the question whether
the award shall be measured as compensatory damages are measured at common
law, or according to some prescribed scale reasonably adapted to produce a fair
result, is for the state itself to determine. 83
In the five cases that were consolidated in the Arizona Copper cases84 the Court
UHMHFWHGHPSOR\HUV¶DUJXPHQWVWKDWWKH$UL]RQD(PSOR\HUV¶/LDELOLW\$FWGHSULYHd them
of liberty and property. The employers had objected to several features of the law, and the
Court responded in a manner that could just as easily be applied to employee benefits as
employer defenses:
Some expressions contained in our opinion in the White Case . . . are treated in
argument as if they were equivalent to saying that if a state, in making a legislative
DGMXVWPHQWRIHPSOR\HUV¶OLDELOLW\GHSDUWVIURPWKHFRPPRQ-law system of basing
responsibility upon fault, it must confine itself to a limited compensation, measured
and ascertained according to the methods adopted in the compensation acts of the
present day. Of course, nothing of the kind was intended. In a previous part of the
opinion . . . it had been shown that the employer had no constitutional right to
continued immunity from liability in the absence of negligence, nor to have the
fellow servant rule and the rules respecting contributory negligence and assumption
of risk remain unchanged. The statutory plan of compensation for injured workmen
and the dependents of those fatally injured-an additional feature at variance with
the common law-was then upheld; but, of course, without saying that no other
would be constitutional.85
By implication, this passage suggests that the Arizona Copper Court would have
KHOGXSRQFKDOOHQJHE\³LQMXUHGZRUNPHQ´WKDWWKHVWDWXWRU\SODQRIFRPSHQVDWLRQIRU
those workmen could have taken other (more meager) forms without offending the
77. See Mountain Timber, 243 U.S. 219 and accompanying text; see also the similar statements in White, 243
U.S. 188.
78. 250 U.S. 596 (1919).
79. 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
80. Bianc, 250 U.S. at 600.
81. Id. at 601, 603.
82. Id. at 601.
83. Id. at 602 (quoting Arizona Copper Co., 250 U.S. at 429) (quotation marks omitted).
84. Arizona Copper Co., 250 U.S. at 400.
85. Id. at 428±29 (citations omitted).
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Constitution. Bianc and Arizona Copper thus seemed to establish that states had very wide
ODWLWXGHLQGHVLJQLQJZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPVHYHQDVHDFKFDVHFRQWLQXHGWRKLQW
DWWKHQHHGIRUUHDVRQDEOHQHVVDQG³IDLUUHVXOWV´ 86
:KHQ WKH &RXUW GHFLGHG WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ RI FRPSXOVRU\ VWDWH ZRUNHUV¶
compensation statutes as applied to non-hazardous employments in the 1922 case Ward &
Gow v. Krinsk,87 the Court was not presented with, and did not independently discuss, the
adequacy or reasonableness of employee benefits. In its general defense of compulsory
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWion systems and employee liability acts, however, the Court said,
$VXIILFLHQWYLQGLFDWLRQRIFRPSXOVRU\:RUNPHQ¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQDQG(PSOR\HUV¶
Liability Acts, as it has seemed to this court, is found in the public interest of the
state in the lives and personal security of those who are under the protection of its
laws, from which it follows that, when men are employed in hazardous occupations
for gain, it is within the power of the state to charge the pecuniary losses arising
from disabling or fatal personal injury, to some extent, at least, against the industry
after the manner of casualty insurance, instead of allowing them to rest where they
may happen to fall, upon the particular injured employees or their dependents, and
to this end to require that the employer²he who organizes and directs the
enterprise, hires the workmen, fixes the wages, sets a price upon the product,
receives the gross proceeds, pays the costs and the losses, and takes for his reward
the net profits, if any²shall make or secure to be made such compensation as
reasonably may be prescribed, to be paid in the event of the injury or death of one
of those employed, instead of permitting the entire risk to be assumed by the
individuals immediately affected. In general, as in the New York law, provisions
for compulsory compensation are made to apply only to those employed in
hazardous occupations, where it may be contemplated by both parties in advance
that sooner or later some of those employed probably will sustain accidental injury
in the course of the employment, but where nobody can know in advance which
particular employees or how many will be the victims, or how serious will be the
injuries.88
Krinsky, while offering a much more sophisticated economic justification for
FRPSXOVRU\ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQHYHQDVDSSOLHGWRQRQKD]DUGRXVHPSOR\PHQWDJDLQ
GLVFXVVHGOLDELOLW\DV³VXFKFRPSHQVDWLRQDVUHDVRQDEO\PD\EHSUHVFULEHG´E\WKHVWDWH
Throughout the decade, the Court accepted²in White, in Bianc, and now in Krinsky²that
the New York schedule of benefits was fair, or adequate, or reasonable. But why?
6HHPLQJO\XQFULWLFDODFFHSWDQFHRIZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQHPSOR\HHEHQHILWOHYHOV
by the courts was not likely the by-product of lack of political controversy, however.
Benefit levels were, in fact, controversial throughout the United States during the period
RIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKHV\VWHP 89 In an influential text on the origins of
86. Bianc, 250 U.S. at 602.
87. 259 U.S. 503 (1922).
88. Id. at 512±13.
89. George Young, a Wyoming representative perhaps echoing some national sentiment, was not happy with
the first decade of the twentieth century benefit levels in Wyoming:
7KHZRUNLQJPHQRI:\RPLQJZDQWDZRUNPDQ¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQODZ7KH\QDWXUDOO\ZDQWDODZWKDW
carries the very highest possible benefits. I want to say now that it is my honest conviction that the
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workers¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ The Prelude to the Welfare State, Price Fishback and Shawn
.DQWRUGHYRWHGDFKDSWHUWR$PHULFDQSROLWLFDOVWUXJJOHVRYHUEHQHILWOHYHOVDVZRUNHUV¶
compensation statutes were being implemented in various states.90 The conclusion of these
schRODUVLVWKDWDVZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQHYROYHGLQLWVQDVFHQWGHFDGHVEHQHILWOHYHOV
were influenced by workers, employers, and social reformers: ³>+@RZ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation benefits varied across states depended on the relative strength of the interest
JURXSVDQGWKHHFRQRPLFIDFWRUVWKDWLQIOXHQFHGWKHLUGHPDQGV´91 This is what one would
expect, leaving to one side doubts about widespread employee participation in the process
(if nothing else, workers were voters).92 The benefit level debate must have proceeded
from baselines, however. Where did the baselines originate? Although this Part has shown
WKDW WKH &RXUW EURDGO\ DSSURYHG ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWHV LQ D KDQGIXO RI VWDWHV
WhiteDULVLQJIURPSRZHUIXODQGLQIOXHQWLDO1HZ<RUNZDVWKH&RXUW¶Vfirst opinion, and
was, evidently, the touchstone for all that followed. Why was the Court convinced that the
New York system was reasonable and adequate?93
III. 1917 CONTEXT
This Part discusses the social context in which the just discussed, seminal workerV¶
compensation cases were being decided. Specifically, it will show the constant interplay
EHWZHHQ UHODWLYHO\ XQNQRZQ SULYDWH DFWRUV DQG VWDWH ZRUNPHQ¶V FRPSHQVDWLRQ
commissions appointed by governors and legislators during the first decade of the
twentieWKFHQWXU\WRPDNHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPV
7KH3DUWZLOODOVRVKRZWKDWFDQYDVVLQJRI(XURSHDQZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPVE\
private actors crystalized options and was substantially responsible for creating the New
York proto-statute that was ultimately ruled constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in
White.
A. Background
It is easy for 21st century readers to underappreciate the magnitude of the late 19 th
benefits specified in this act are too low.
It is true that we have no adequate figures at hand, that apply particularly to our State, that would let
us accurately base a demand for higher rates with the certain knowledge that the fund accumulated
would pay for them. It is because of this, and because of the fact that presenting a demand for higher
rates of compensation would open the way for all sorts of amendments to the bill, that I make this
statement. The time for consideration of the bill is short; amendments here might encourage
amendments elsewhere; opposition might be excited to the measure, and I want no act of mine to
endanger the passage of the bill.
H. Journal, 13th Leg. 329 (Wyo. 1915).
90. FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 20, at 172.
91. Id. at 173.
92. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND
THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 9, 10 (2004).
93. Part of the equation probably has to do with the arguments parties were not advancing because of the
procedural posture of cases. As the lead cases demonstrate, litigation was usually launched by companies
FKDOOHQJLQJWKHVFRSHRIWKHVWDWH¶VSROLFHSRZHU7KHTXHVWLRQRIHPSOR\HHUHPHGLHVDQGEHQHILWVZRXOGQRW
have been featured. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that employers could have aggressively pursued theories
of employee benefit inadequacy as a strategy for scuttling the scheme. The Court demonstrated in both White
and Mountain Timber that it was willing to consider such arguments.
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and early 20th FHQWXU\ ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ SURMHFW $V -RKQ Fabian Witt has noted,
policy makers and academics during this period ZHUHLQYROYHGLQD³YLEUDQWWUDQVDWODQWLF
GLDORJXH´RQLQGXVWULDODFFLGHQWV94 :K\WUDQVDWODQWLF"%HFDXVHVHYHUDO(XURSHDQZRUNHUV¶
compensation statutes were already in existence beginning in the late 19th century, and
(XURSH KDG D VXEVWDQWLDO LQIOXHQFH RQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI $PHULFDQ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation systems.95
Witt also notes that:
,QWKHILUVWGHFDGHRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\DVZRUNPHQ¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQ
statutes became a topic of serious of conversation in American
legislatures, teams of reformers and academics travelled to Europe under
the aegis of such organizations as the Russell Sage Foundation, the
National Association of Manufacturers, and the Department of Labor to
see for themselves how other nations dealt with accident compensation. 96
This article contends that it was dialogue between the teams Witt mentions and state
commissions that created benchmarks of adequacy against which the Supreme Court
considered the New York statute, sub silentio. The teams¶ stated objective was the creation
of a uniform law that could be tested against constitutional challenge in impact litigation.97
0RGHO ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWHV ZHUH LQ IDFW GUDIWHG DQG QDWLRQDOO\ FLUFXODWHG 98
though oQO\DIWHUWKHILUVWPDMRUZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVWDWXWHKDGEHHQVWUXFNdown by
the New York Court of Appeals.99 The process resembled a regulatory negotiation
resulting in consensus standards.100 Broad, extra-legal negotiation was not unknown to
policy makers of the early 20th century, and an apt comparison could be made to mostly
private labor-management negotiation of the federal Railway Labor Act in 1926. 101
Viewed in this way, White DQG LWV SURJHQ\ ZHUH QDVFHQW ³GHIHUHQFH´ FDVHV LQ ZKLFK
informally-appointed, quasi-political commissions played the role of ad hoc expert
agencies involved in analysis of a national problem during a period preceding the mature
federal administrative state.102 It is true, of course, that deferring to experts reveals only
what is reasonable and not what is unreasonable, and that is perhaps a good way to explain
some of the modern disutility of White. Still, glimpsing the nature of expert opinion of the
94. WITT, supra note 92, at 9.
95. See Joseph LaDou, The European Influence on Workers’ Compensation Reform in the United States, 10
ENVIRON. HEALTH 103 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3267658/.
96. WITT, supra note 92, at 10 n.42.
97. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN¶S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 51±52 (1909),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000000094435;view=1up;seq=9.
98. See, e.g. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE WORKMEN¶S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENTS 39±43 (1910), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951002082754 [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE].
99. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 431, 438-42 (1911).
100. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L. REV. 1, 35 (1982)
(discussing the ways in which private negotiation can resemble regulatory negotiation).
101. See Laurence Scott Zakson, Railway Labor Legislation 1888-1930: A Legal History of Congressional
Labor relations Policy, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 317, 362 n.247 (1989) (describing six months of conferencing between
representatives of labor and management which produced a proposal that would become in all important respects
the Railway Labor Act of 1926).
102. This conceptualization gives renewed emphasis to the excellent title of Price Fishback and Shawn
.DQWRU¶VLQIOXHQWLDOERRNFLWHGWKURXJKRXWWKLVDUWLFOH. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 39. One might add,
³3UHOXGHWRWKH[Administrative] 6WDWH´
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1910s provide insight into the contemporaneous scope of reasonableness which probably
influenced the Court.
B. The 1909/1910 National Conference on Workmen’s Compensation for Industrial
Accidents: The Minnesota Initiative
The first of the important expert bodies of the decade was the National Conference
RQ:RUNPHQ¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQIRU,QGustrial Accidents. On July 29, 1909, a conference on
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQZDVFRQYHQHGLQ$WODQWLF&LW\1HZ-HUVH\7KHDQQRXQFHPHQWRI
the conference sent to invitees stated:
You are, invited to be present at The Marlborough-Blenheim, at Atlantic City, July
29-31 and take part in a conference with the various State and Government officials
and others interested in legislation changing the basis of recovery, for injuries
received in the course of employment from that of negligence or fault of the
employer, to that of risk of the industry or insurance; at which conference the
persons whose names appear under the several subjects will be asked to lead the
discussions along the respective lines appearing in the program herein. You are
requested to extend this invitation to such persons as can contribute knowledge on
the subject.103
7KH&KDLURIWKH0LQQHVRWD(PSOR\HHV¶&RPPLVVLRQVLJQHGWKHDQQRXQFHPHQW 104
A second such conference was held on January 20, 1910, and a third on June 10, 1910. 105
One could argue, based upon these conferences, that the Minnesota Commission was a
SULPH PRYHU LQ QDWLRQDO ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ GLDORJXH 'XULQJ WKH -XQH 
FRQIHUHQFH IRU H[DPSOH DWWHQGHG E\ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI VWDWH ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ
commissions or delegations from Minnesota, Wisconsin, New York (Crystal Eastman
appeared, among others), Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Maryland, and
Connecticut,106 WKH0LQQHVRWD&RPPLVVLRQRXWOLQHGLWVZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQSURFHVVWR
date.107 The Commission explained that after identifyLQJWKHQHHGIRUDQDWLRQDOZRUNHUV¶
compensation conversation at a Minnesota State Bar Association meeting in 1908, the Bar
Association created a Minnesota Commission comprised of various stakeholders from
within the state.108 The newly-minted Commission widely canvassed a range of opinion
on the failings of the tort system to remedy workplace injuries. Eventually, the
Commission, with the assistance of various commentators, drew up a Model Code, which
it distributed and discussed at the June 10 meeting.109
The Code would apply to all employers and not just those engaged in extrahazardous

103. PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE WORKMEN¶S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
prefatory note (1909), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000000094435;view=1up;seq=9 [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE].
104. Id.
105. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 98, at 3.
106. Id. at 10±38.
107. Id. at 33±38.
108. Id. at 33.
109. Id. at 40±43.
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industries.110 For injuries resulting in immediate death, death occurring within five years,
or total incapacity of five years or longer, the Code would have provided sixty percent of
wages the injured worker was receiving at time of injury, for a period of five years, up to
a maximum of three-thousand dollars.111 For incapacity lasting fewer than five years, the
Code would have provided sixty-percent of the pre-injury wage, or sixty-percent of the
wage-loss occasioned by the injury, depending on whether incapacity was total or
partial.112 In addition, the Code would have provided for a schedule of supplemental
benefits when certain parts of the body were injured: forty percent of pre-injury wages for
five years for loss of both feet, both hands, or a foot and a hand; 113 fifteen percent of preinjury wages for five years for loss of a foot, a hand or an eye.114 5HFRYHU\IRU³PDLPLQJ´
of the scheduled body parts could be adjusted proportionally.115 However, limits applied
to the stacking of benefits: in no instance could all benefits exceed what the injured worker
had been earning in wages at the time of injury; and in no event could all benefits received
exceed five thousand dollars.116 The Code would not have provided for payment of
medical expenses incurred as a result of work-related injuries.
The treatment of extrahazardous employments was novel. 117 Although several of the
HDUOLHVW ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWHV LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV²includLQJ 1HZ <RUN¶V²
were elective, or voluntary, for non-extrahazardous employers, the Code would have
defined hazardous employment sufficiently broadly that any employer experiencing an
accident was essentially hazardous.118 Thus, as a practical matter, the Code would have
been compulsory for most employers and employees. Additionally, the remedies for workrelated injuries as defined in the Code would have been exclusive:
Sec. 4. Repeal of other liabilities. The right to compensation and the remedy
therefor, as KHUHLQVSHFL¿HGVKDOOEHLQOLHXRIDOORWKHUFDXVHVRIDFWLRQIRUVXFK
injuries and awards upon which they are based as to all persons covered by this act,
whether formerly authorized or allowed by, or as the result of, either state, statute
or common law, and no other compensation, right of action, damages or liability,
either for such injuries or for any result thereof, either in favor of those covered by
this act or against such employer based on state law, shall hereafter be allowed for
such injuries to any persons or for any of the injuries covered by this act so long as
this law shall remain in force, unless, and then only to the extent, that this law shall
EHVSHFL¿FDOO\DPHQGHG119

110. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 99, at 40.
111. Id. This amount equals roughly $80,000 in 2018 dollars. This and all upcoming inflation conversions for
weekly benefit amounts are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator,
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
112. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 98, at 40. Wage-loss benefits would be
obtained by subtracting post-injury wages from the pre-injury wage and taking sixty-percent of the difference.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 40±41.
116. Id. at 41. About $132,600 in 2018 dollars.
117. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 98, at 54, 85.
118. Id. at 47.
119. Id. at 41.
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In reflecting upon the proposed Code, it should be born in mind that the Minnesota
Commission had reportedly gathered information and data from the states of
Massachusetts, Illinois, and New York; it sought but could not obtain relevant data from
various charities, unions, or (at least at that time) from the National Association of
Manufacturers; it wrote to conservative labor leader Samuel Gompers, who, interestingly,
had not yet adequately studied the matter; it wrote to radical labor leader Eugene Debs,
who had studied the matter more comprehensively than Gompers and provided
FRPSDUDWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWLQWHUQDWLRQDOZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPVDQGLWKDG
communicated with industrialist Andrew Carnegie, who said he preferred the English
system.120 The Minnesota Commission was aware of the various constitutional challenges
likely to be raised, and addressed them in its report.121
The Minnesota Commission made direct contact with the Russell Sage Foundation
investigators who were studying WKHGHVLJQRI(XURSHDQZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPV
during the summer of 1908.122 After establishing the Russell Sage contacts, the Minnesota
Commission invited the investigators to the conference of July 1909, thereby sharing with
state officials, and others, details of the operation of European and British Commonwealth
systems,123 some of which had been in existence since 1877.124 Dr. Lee K. Frankel, one of
the principal Russell Sage Foundation investigators, candidly stated at the July 1909
conference:
I hope that the outcome of this meeting will be some effort toward uniformity in
legislation. You will notice that I have refrained from expressing any opinion as to
whether any of the foreign systems are adaptable to the United States. My own
thought is that between the compulsory scheme in Germany and the purely
compensatory scheme in England we shall find some sort of a mean that is
adaptable to and that can be practically administered in the United States. We shall
probably find that such a scheme will be adaptable not only to one but to all of our
states. Except so far as their geographical situation is concerned, and so far as there
may be certain industries in certain localities, there are not sufficient differences
between our states to warrant us in having different legislation in each state. If this
meeting can do nothing else than to get together on some uniform basis, it would
be doing a great deal. I thoroughly believe that if we are ever to obtain such
legislation here, it will have to be done by a concurrence of opinion on the part of
such commissions as are already created, so that each one shall be able to
recommend to their respective legislatures a draft of a bill with the statement that
this draft has been accepted by the commissions of other states. The moral force of
such a statement in the beginning of new legislation cannot be over-estimated.125
The statement strongly suggests that from the beginning of serious national

120. Id. 34±35.
121. Id. at 35.
122. PROCEEDINGS, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 103, at 13±14.
123. Id. at 231±44 (testimony of Dr. Lee K. Frankel discussing the systems of England, Sweden, Belgium,
France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland).
124. Id. at 237±38.
125. Id. at 243.
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GHOLEHUDWLRQ RQ ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ²involving state commissions,126 academics,
NGOs, and insurance companies127²national uniformity was an important goal, and
European systems were to be studied closely and emulated wherever possible. The
statement also suggests that, despite broad conversation on several European laws, the
German and English systems were quickly the leading candidates for emulation. From the
point of view of employee benefits,128 what were the differences between the German and
English systems? A summary comparison prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in
1917, helps to explain the features of the two systems as they would have existed in around
the first decade of the twentieth century, when the National Conferences were being
held.129
1. The German System
The German Act was first enacted in 1884, and then amended several times. 130 The
Code of 1911 compensated injuries by accident in the course of the employment, causing
death, or disability for more than three days, unless caused intentionally by the injured
worker.131 Compensation could be denied or reduced if injury was sustained while the
worker was committing an illegal act. 132 A variety of industries were covered, and while
PRVW ZHUH H[WUDKD]DUGRXV PDQ\ ZHUH QRW &RYHUHGLQGLYLGXDOVLQFOXGHGDOO³ZRUNPHQ
DQGDSSUHQWLFHV´DQGFHUWDLQJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOV133 Importantly, voluntary coverage of
employers not under the jurisdiction of the law could be approved by the State, upon
request. The statute covered medical and surgical treatment for ninety-one days following
the injury.134 Benefit payments from the beginning of the fourth to the ninety-first day
were provided by sick-benefit funds, to which employers contributed one-third and
employees two-thirds. From the beginning of twenty-ninth day post-injury, to the ninetyfirst day, payments were increased by one-third, solely at the expense of the involved
employer. After the ninety-first day, and in case of death from injuries, the expense of the
LQMXU\ZDVERUQHE\HPSOR\HUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQVZKLFKZHUHVXSSRUWHGE\WKHFRQWULEXWLRQV
of employers (but not employees).135
Compensation for death included:
126. Id. at 1±2. Present at the first conference were members of the state commissions (or other state officials)
from Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington D.C., and New York.
127. PROCEEDINGS, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 103, at 1±2. The list of attendees at the first
conference included executives or representatives from Aetna Life Insurance Co., Travelers Insurance Co.,
General Accident Insurance Corporation, Fidelity and Casualty Co., United States Casualty Co., Ocean accident
and Guaranty Co., Maryland Casualty Co., and Liability Insurance.
128. Structurally, the two systems were very different in that the German system compensated in an integrated
manner sickness, workplace injury, and disability within an overall social insurance scheme while the British
system was focused exclusively on workplace injuries. A full discussion of the many differences between the
two systems is beyond the scope of this article.
129. U.S. DEP¶T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 316±17.
130. Id. at 316.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. U.S. DEP¶T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 316.
135. Id.
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Funeral benefits of one-fifteenth of annual earnings of deceased, but not less
than 50 marks ($11.90).
Pensions to dependent heirs not exceeding 60% of annual earnings of the
deceased.136
Compensation for disability was as follows:

x
x

x
x
x

Free medical and surgical treatment paid during the first 13 weeks of incapacity
E\VLFNEHQHILWIXQGVDQGDIWHUZDUGVE\HPSOR\HUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQV
For temporary or permanent total disability, 50% of daily wages of persons
similarly employed, but not exceeding 3 marks (71 cents), paid by sick benefit
funds from beginning of fourth day to end of fourth week; from fifth to end of
thirteenth week, above allowance by sick benefit fund, plus 16 1/3%
contributed by the employer directly; after 13 weeks, 66 2/3% of average
annual earnings of injured person paid by employers associations.
For complete helplessness necessitating attendance, payments could be
increased to 100% of annual earnings.
For partial disability, a corresponding reduction in payments was made.
If annual earnings [from benefits payments] exceeded 1,800 marks ($428.40),
only one-third of the excess was considered in computing pensions.

Benefit payments could be revised whenever a change in condition of an injured
worker occurred.137
'LVSXWHVZHUHVHWWOHGE\WKH³VXSHULRULQVXUDQFHRIILFHV´composed of Government
officials and an equal number of representatives of employers and employees. 138
2. The English System139
The English Act was first enacted in 1897, and the Russell Sage investigators would
have been doing their work after the passage of a major amendment in 1906, which went
into effect in 1907.140 The law compensated injuries by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment, which caused death, or disabled a workman for at least one
week from earning full wages.141 Compensation was not paid when injury resulted from
the serious and willful misconduct of a worker, unless it caused death or serious and
permanent disability.142 ³$Q\ HPSOR\PHQW´ ZDV FRYHUHG DV ZDV ³DQ\ SHUVRQ UHJXODUO\
HPSOR\HGIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VWUDGHor business whose compensation was
less than £250 ($1,216.63) per year (persons engaged exclusively in manual labor were
not subject to this limitation).143 The Act applied to civilian persons employed under the
Crown (government employees) as if the employer were a private person. The entire cost

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP¶T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 316.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP¶T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 317. Roughly $32,300 in 2018 dollars.
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of compensation rested upon the employer. 144
Compensation for death included:
x

x

x

$VXPHTXDOWRWKUHH\HDUV¶HDUQLQJVEXWQRWOHVVWKDQ   QRUPRUH
than £300 ($1,459.95),145 to those entirely dependent on the earnings of the
deceased.
A sum of less than the above amount if deceased left persons partially
dependent on his or earnings, with the amount to be agreed upon by the parties
or fixed by arbitration.
Reasonable expenses of medical attendance and burial, but not to exceed £10
($48.67),146 if the deceased left no dependents.
Compensation for disability included:

x

x

x
x

$ZHHNO\SD\PHQWGXULQJLQFDSDFLW\RIQRWPRUHWKDQRIDQHPSOR\HH¶V
average weekly earnings during previous twelve months, but not exceeding £1
($4.87)147 per week; if incapacity lasted less than two weeks no payment was
required for the first week.
A weekly payment during partial disability, not exceeding the difference
EHWZHHQWKHHPSOR\HH¶VDYHUDJHZHHNO\HDUQLQJVEHIRUHLQMXU\DQGWKHDYHUDJH
amount which he or she was earning, or was able to earn, after injury.
0LQRU SHUVRQV¶ HDUQLQJV ZHUH IXOO\ FRYHUHG GXULQJ LQFDSDFLW\ EXW ZHHNO\
benefits could not exceed 10 shillings ($2.43).148
A sum sufficient to purchase a life annuity of 75% annual value of weekly
payments could be substituted, on application of the employer, for weekly
payments after six months; but other arrangements for redemption of weekly
payments could be made by agreement between employer and employee. 149

Weekly payments could be revised at the request of either party, under regulations
issued by the secretary of state.150
Employers could make contracts with employees for substitution of a scheme of
compensation, benefit, or insurance in place of the provisions of the act, if officials
certified the scheme was not less favorable to the workmen and their dependents than the
SURYLVLRQVRIWKHDFWDQGWKDWDPDMRULW\RIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VZRUNPHQZHUHIDYRUDEOHWRWKH
substitute.151 The employer was then liable only for compliance with the provisions of the
scheme.152
,QFDVHRIDQHPSOR\HU¶VEDQNUXSWF\WKHDPRXQWRIFRPSHQVDWLRQGXHXQGHUWKHDFW
up to £100 ($486.65) in any individual case, was classed as a preferred claim. 153
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. Not less than $19,344 or more than $38,725 in 2018 dollars.
Id. About $1291 in 2018 dollars.
Id. About $129 in 2018 dollars.
U.S. DEP¶T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 317. About $64 in 2018 dollars.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP¶T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 317.
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Questions arising under the law were settled either by committee representatives of
WKHHPSOR\HUDQGWKHHPSOR\HU¶VZRUNPHQE\DQDUELWUDWRUVHOHFWHGE\WKHWZRSDUWLHV
or, if the parties could not agree, by the judge of the relevant county court, who could
DSSRLQWDQDUELWUDWRUWRDFWLQWKHMXGJH¶VSODFH154
Thus, the German and English systems paid indemnity benefits of between 50% and
66 2/3% of the average weekly wage of the injured or deceased worker. The German
system appears to have been substantially more generous than the English system with
respect to medical benefits; and it is possible that those who favored the English system
did so for this reason. Indeed, this may be understating the case because the English Act
of 1906 contained no provision for payment of work injury-related medical benefits,155
while the German system typically provided full medical benefits for the duration of a
disability caused by an accident.156 Eventually, in 1911, the English enacted a national
health insurance law, the National Insurance Act of 1911, which effectively rendered moot
noncRYHUDJHRIPHGLFDOEHQHILWVE\WKHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHP 157 The Insurance
Act was FKDPSLRQHG E\ 'DYLG /OR\G *HRUJH GUDZLQJ DV LQVSLUDWLRQ %LVPDUFN¶V 
FRPSUHKHQVLYH FRGH RI ZKLFK WKH *HUPDQ ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ V\VWHP XQGHU
discussion was a part.158
The German system also appeared to treat beneficiaries of workers killed by workrelated injuries more favorably than did the English system.
C. The 1911 National Association of Manufacturers Report
The Minnesota Commission was not alone in investigating the feasibility of
LPSOHPHQWLQJZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KH1DWLRQDO$VVRFLDWLRQRI
0DQXIDFWXUHUV 1$0 ZDVDOVRGLUHFWO\LQYROYHGLQUHVHDUFKLQJZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ
systems, a process it was carrying out just as the Minnesota Commission was reporting
findings in connection with its investigations. To this end, that organization dispatched
)UHG * 6FKZHGWPDQ DQG -DPHV ( (PHU\ RQ D IRXU PRQWKV¶ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI (XURSH
where the two men personally visited the countries of England, Germany, France, Austria,
Hungary Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. 159 Each of these countries had already
HVWDEOLVKHGZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPV 160 The team produced an exhaustive report,
154. Id.
155. :RUNPHQ¶V &RPSHQVDWLRQ $FW RI  6 Edw. VII, c.58, reprinted in 2 HARRY B. BRADBURY,
BRADBURY¶S WORKMEN¶S COMPENSATION AND STATE INSURANCE LAW 1735 (2nd. Ed. 1914).
156. Id.
157. See J. H. WATTS, THE LAW RELATING TO NATIONAL INSURANCE: WITH AN EXPLANATORY
INTRODUCTION 76 (eds. Stevens & Sons 1913) (defining covered individuals as all persons employed).
158. Although beyond the scope of this article, the German code was actually three laws in one: the Health
Insurance of Workers Law of 1883 (covering illness); the Accident Insurance Law of 1884 (work injuries); and
the Old Age and Invalidity Law of 1889 (pensions and long-term total disability). CHRISTA ALTENSTETTER,
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, in Germany: A Country Study 200 (ed. Eric Solsten, 1996).
159. See FRED G. SCHWEDTMAN & JAMES E. EMERY, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND RELIEF: AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT IN EUROPE, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO ENGLAND AND GERMANY:
TOGETHER WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
OF
MANUFACTURERS
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA
xxiii,
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030424603;view=1up;seq=29.
160. See U.S. DEP¶T. OF LABOR, supra note 6.
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which was adopted by the NAM. The document ran two hundred and sixty-nine pages,
and, among other things, made an extended comparison of the English and German
systems. As significant as the findings and conclusions reached by the drafters of the
document turned out to be, the sheer number of sources relied upon to generate those
findings and conclusions rendered it authoritative. Like the Russell Sage report, the NAM
report resembled an expert governmental document. Many experts were consulted in the
course of its creation, particularly from Germany. 161 Moreover, the report claimed to have
surveyed ten-thousand employers in advance of its issuance. 162 The cover pages of the
report bore the names of individuals drawn from an extremely broad swath of American
industrialism.163 Notably, the report reflected, in those same cover pages, the name of J.M.
*OHQQ 'LUHFWRU RI WKH 5XVVHOO 6DJH )RXQGDWLRQ ZKR ZDV DOVR D PHPEHU RI 1$0¶V
Advisory Board of the Committee on Industrial Indemnity Insurance.164 A summary of the
UHSRUW¶VILQGLQJVLVHQRXJKWRFDSWXUHWKHGHSWKRIWKH1$0¶VGHliberations:
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x

Limited compensation for work-related personal injuries already existed in the
major European countries and British Colonies based on the recognition that
industrial accidents are often simply unavoidable and the cost for those
accidents should not be born exclusively by the workman but should be treated
as a cost of production and spread accordingly. 165
Handling workplace injuries leads to bitterness and it was in the public interest
to expedite the process.166
Self-inflicted injury should result in reduced or no compensation.167
All employments should be included in the system.168
While the European systems were not perfect, they worked well enough to
SURYLGH FRQFOXVLYH HYLGHQFH WKDW WKH JHQHUDO DSSURDFK RI ZRUNHUV¶
compensation was socially, economically, and industrially advantageous.169
The proposed system could not work without vigorous accident prevention and
provision to injured workers of first-aid without risk of diminished benefits.170
Professional administrators were necessary to carry out the requirements of
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQDFWVDQGWRDGMXVWSUDFWLFHVZKHUHQHFHVVDU\.171
7KH *HUPDQ (PSLUH KDG EHHQ WKH PRVW VXFFHVVIXO LQ DSSO\LQJ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation because of its careful compilation of statistics and scientific
study of accident avoidance (though many details of its administration were
neither applicable nor desirable).172

161. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 273±327 (reproducing approximately twenty-five uniformly
positive letters from prominent German authorities on their impressions of the operation of the German system).
162. Id. at xiii.
163. Id. at vii±xi.
164. Id. at x.
165. Id. at 259.
166. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 259±60.
167. Id. at 260.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 260.
171. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 261.
172. Id.
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7KHFKLHISULQFLSOHVRIWKH*HUPDQV\VWHPFRXOGEHDGRSWHGLQWKHVWDWHV³E\
voluntary action or through permissive legislation and, in a large degree
compelled b\VWDWXWH´173
7KHEDVLVRIZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPVLQ(XURSHZDVFRPSHQVDWLRQIRU
loss of work capacity and was not based on fault.174
If every employer became a limited insurer in law, it should also become an
insurer in fact, and the obligation to pay into a common insurance fund should
be a substitute for legal liability.175
Limited compensation through insurance was most successfully obtained
through creation of a fund administered by the state, or a fund supervised by
the state, or through voluntary mutual associations, or in private insurance
associations.176
Employees should pay a small portion towards maintenance of the insurance
fund to discourage fraudulent claims and encourage mutual cooperation.177
A single liability (in other than exceptional cases VKRXOGDSSO\DQGDZRUNHUV¶
compensation system should discourage all other legal liability.178
The principle of compensation should be universal, or it places unequal burdens
RQ FODVVHV RI HPSOR\HUV DQG GHQLHV FRPSHQVDWLRQ WR ³YDVW FODVVHV RI´
employees.179
Compensation in Europe was not regarded as a complete indemnity but as a
³VXEVWDQWLDOH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHLPSDLUPHQWRIHDUQLQJFDSDFLW\.´180
7KHEHWWHUV\VWHPVQHLWKHUDOORZHGQRULQWHQGHGWR³UHFRPSHQVHWULYLDOLQMXULHV
nor breed paupers by corrupting thrifW´ DQG DFFRUGLQJO\ ZDLWLQJ SHULRGV181
were desirable, though employers should provide medical first aid during those
waiting periods.182
The system should feature cheap and expeditious adjustment of claims along
the lines of European systems of arbitration, subject only to questions of law
that may arise for the courts.183
$Q\ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV PXVW EH
substantially uniform or it would produce harmful conditions.184

NAM was aware that significant legal challenges to the system would occur but
encouraged voluntary actions by private employers and implementation by states of

173. Id.
174. Id. at 262.
175. Id.
176. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 263.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 264.
179. Id. at 265.
180. Id. This, of course, is where all the fighting occurs. How substantial?
181. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 265. $ ZDLWLQJ SHULRG LV D IHDWXUH RI PDQ\ ZRUNHUV¶
compensation systems and essentially excludes coverage of injuries unless disability lasts long enough to become
compensable. The period in modern times extends from roughly one to three weeks. See LEX K. LARSON,
LARSON¶S WORKERS¶ COMPENSATION LAW 15, tbl. 14.
182. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 265.
183. Id. at 265±66.
184. Id. at 266.
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voluntary schemes of compensation until legal questions had been resolved
Successful legislative action throughout Europe has been preceded by deliberate and
painstaking investigation, extending in many instances through years of effort in the
collection and comparison of information. We are fortunately able to avail ourselves of the
PRVWSUDFWLFDOIHDWXUHVRIWKH2OG:RUOG¶VODERUDQGH[SHULHQFH%XWZHVKould make a start
for ourselves here and now, providing at once for the accumulation in our respective states
of that accurate information which is a basic necessity for intelligent action. Having once
determined upon a rational policy of compensation, we believe rapid progress can be made
in giving it appropriate legal form and adapting it to our customs and institutions. We should
act now and as rapidly as is compatible with the greatness and complexity of the subject and
its intimate relation to the prosperity of the employers and workmen of our country.185

7KHSUHIHUHQFHIRUWKH*HUPDQV\VWHPLVSDOSDEOHIURPWKHUHSRUW¶VILQGLQJV7KH
next section discusses developments following the groundwork laid by the Minnesota
Commission and the NAM report.
D. The Role of the National Civic Federation
Following the investigations and reporting of the Minnesota Commission Initiative
DQGWKH1$0JURXSWKH1DWLRQDO&LYLF)HGHUDWLRQ ³1&)´ ZDVLQVWUXPHQWDOLQDFWXDOO\
GUDIWLQJHDUO\ ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQELOOV 186 The NCF was organized in around 1900,
and was initially formed around a program of conciliation and mediation between large
unions and corporations.187 It was led by executives of very large companies and
comprised of business, labor, and public interests. 188 Samuel Gompers, for example, was
a member of the NCF, and the organization had the reputation for both opposing the spread
RIXQLRQLVPDQGVXSSRUWLQJ³UHVSRQVLEOH´XQLRQV189 7KH1&)¶VPHPEHUVKLSZDVGLYHUVH
enormous, and influential:
By 1903 almost one-third of the 367 corporations with a capitalization of more than
$10,000,000 were represented in the National Civic Federation, as were sixteen of the sixtyseven largest railroads in the United States. Labor was also represented by its top leaders.
Samuel Gompers was the original First Vice President of the Federation, a position he
retained until his death in 1925. John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers was an active
member and fulltime head of the Trade Agreements Department from 1908 to 1911. The
heads of the major railroad brotherhoods and many A.F.L. international unions were also on
the executive committee.190

This matters because, by 1908, the NCF had established an Industrial Insurance
Commission which, while initially somewhat inactive, became much more active in 1909,
DV1&)PHPEHUVFDPHWRVWURQJO\HPEUDFHWKHSULQFLSOHVRIZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ 191
185. Id. at 268.
186. See James Weinstein, Big Business and the Origins of Workmen’s Compensation, 8 LAB. HIST. 156, 162
(1967).
187. Id. at 162.
188. Id. at 162±63.
189. Id. at 163.
190. Id. at 162.
191. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 166.
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$XJXVW%HOPRQW-UWKHIDPRXVILQDQFLHUZDVDSSRLQWHGWRKHDGWKH1&)¶V'HSDUWPHQW
on Compensation for Industrial Accidents and their Prevention, and, thereafter, the NCF
EHJDQWRDJJUHVVLYHO\GUDIWZRUNPHQ¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQELOOV 192 Shortly after being assigned
WRWKH1&)¶V'HSDUWPHQWRI&RPSHQVDWLRQ%HOPRQWDSSRLQWHGDELOO-drafting committee
headed by former New York Commissioner of Labor, and conservative lawyer, P.
Tecumseh Sherman.193 6KHUPDQWKRXJKWWKH*HUPDQZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQV\VWHPZDV
EHVW EXW VXUPLVHG WKDW EHFDXVH RI WKDW V\VWHP¶V FRPSUHKHQVLYH QDWXUH LW ZRXOG ERWK
generate hostility and face constitutional hurdles. 194 6KHUPDQ¶V RULJLQDO GUDIW bill was
FLUFXODWHG QDWLRQDOO\ WR ³WKH JRYHUQRUV DQG OHJLVODWRUV RI DOO VWDWHV WKDW KDG DSSRLQWHG
commissions to study compensation, and governors of other states were urged to consider
VXFK OHJLVODWLRQ´195 The bill, which set out an elective, or voluntary, ZRUNHUV¶
compensation system for all but extra hazardous employments, elicited opposition from a
variety of outside actors.196 The president of U.S. Steel, Raynall Bolling, for example,
favored a universally compulsory system. 197 Socialists and progressives favored state,
rather than private, insurance funds, and wanted higher benefits. 198 Even within the NCF,
Hugh Mercer, who had served as Chair at the second National (Minnesota Commission)
&RQIHUHQFH LQ  ZDV DQ RSSRQHQW RI 6KHUPDQ¶V GUDIW 199 But Sherman thought
0HUFHU¶V FRPSHWLQJ ELOO ZKLFK KDG EHHQ VXEVWDQWLDOO\ LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH SURJUHVVLYH
Russell Sage Foundation investigators) a radical, expensive preference of only ten states,
and believed it should not be brought forward in the interest of supporting only a bill that
would be widely accepted and become nationally uniform. 200 By December 1910, the NCF
was receiving regular requests for copies of the bill from governors and legislators all over
the country.201 ,Q-DQXDU\6KHUPDQ¶VELOOZDVDSSURYHGE\ the Executive Council of
the NCF.202 Following the amendment of the New York constitution to allow for a
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQODZDGHEDWHEHWZHHQFRPSHWLQJUHSODFHPHQWELOOVHQVXHGLQWKH
1HZ<RUNOHJLVODWXUHLQZKLFKWKH1&)ELOOVW\OHGWKH³0F&OHOODQG ELOO´FRQWULEXWHGWR
key parts of the final legislation.203 Thus a direct line can be traced from the Minnesota
Commission, to the NAM report, to the NCF, and finally to the version of the New York
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVWDWXWHWKDWZDVXSKHOGE\WKH86Supreme Court in White.
E. What Did the New York Statute Upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court Provide?
The New York legislature enacted the statute eventually upheld in White on

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id.
Weinstein, supra note 186, at 168.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168±69.
Id. at 169.
Weinstein, supra note 186, at 169.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171±74.
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December 16, 1913, and the law went into effect on July 1, 1914. 204 It compensated:
Accidental injuries arising out of and in course of employment, and disease or infection
naturally and unavoidably resulting therefrom, causing disability for more than two weeks,
or death, unless caused by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the
injury or death of himself or another, or by his intoxication while on duty .205

$V 6KHUPDQ VXJJHVWHG WKH $FW ZDV FRPSXOVRU\ RQO\ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR ³KD]DUGRXV
HPSOR\PHQWV´ZKLFKLQFOXGHG
construction, maintenance and operation of steam and street railroads; telegraph, telephone,
and other electrical construction, installation, operation, or repair; foundries, machine shops,
and power plants; stone cutting, crushing, grinding, or dressing; manufactures, tanneries,
laundries, printing, and bookbinding; shipbuilding and repair, and the use of vessels in
intrastate commerce; work in mines, quarries, tunnels, subways, shaft sinking, etc.;
engineering work, and the construction, repair, and demolition of buildings and bridges;
lumbering, draying, loading, and unloading, ice harvesting, freight and passenger elevators,
etc.206

All employees in covered industries were eligible, farm laborers and domestic
servants were explicitly excluded from coverage by the statute.207 Public employment was
explicitly covered under the statute. 208 The entire cost of the insurance was born by the
employer.209
Below are the guidelines the statute set forward for compensation after a workrelated death:
x
x

x

$100 for funeral expenses.
To a widow or dependent widower alone, 30% of wages of deceased, 10%
additional for each child under 18; dependent orphans under 18 receive 15%,
and dependent parents, brothers, or sisters receive 15%; aggregate payments in
no case to exceed 66 2/3%.
Payments to widows or widowers ceased upon death or remarriage or when
GHSHQGHQFHRIZLGRZHUFHDVHGZLWKWZR\HDUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQRQUHPDUULDJH
payments to children, brothers, and sisters ceased at 18, and to parents when
dependence ceased. In computing the above benefits no wages more than $100
monthly were considered.210

Below are the guidelines the statute set forward for compensation after a workrelated disability:
x

Medical and surgical treatment and hospital services for 60 days, with costs to
EHDSSURYHGE\WKHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQFRPPLVVLRQ

204. Summary provided in U.S. DEP¶T OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 151.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Summary provided in U.S. DEP¶T OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 151.
210. Id. (The maximum base wage rate was about $2,500 in 2018 dollars, which means that the maximum
benefit (regardless how distributed) was about $1,667 per month. This inflation conversion is based on the Bureau
of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator.).
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For total disability, 66 2/3% of wages during continuance.
For partial disability, 66 2/3% of wage loss; for specified permanent partial
disabilities (mutilations, etc.), 66 2/3% of wages for fixed periods; there was a
separate provision for disfigurements. 211

The foregoing payments could not be less than $5 nor more than $15 per week, 212
H[FHSWWKDWIRUFHUWDLQ³PDLPLQJV´WKHDJJUHJDWHPD[LPXPEHQHILWZDVFDSSHGDW 213
Awards could be reviewed, at any time, and ended or increased or decreased within the
limits fixed depending on the disability status of the claimant.214
F. Assessing the Range of Reasonableness
The statute enacted by New York in 1913 was at the conservative (it must be said),
(QJOLVK$FWHQGRIDZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVSHFWUXPWKDWKDGEHHQH[KDXVWLYHly studied
on a national level since 1908. The indemnity benefit level, though generally capped at
$15 per week, resembled the structure of the English Act and, for lower income workers,
paid fifteen percent more of the average weekly wage than the English Act. Moreover,
XQOLNH WKH VLWXDWLRQ XQGHU PDQ\ PRGHUQ $PHULFDQ ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWHV
compensation was paid for the duration of a disability, and was not terminated arbitrarily
after a certain period.215 'HFHDVHGZRUNHUV¶VXUYLYRUVZHUHFRPSHQVDWHG on an ongoing
basis, not as comprehensively as under the German system, but comparably to the English
Act. Though the New York Act failed to pay for ongoing medical treatment necessitated
by a work-related injury, the same was true of the English Act, and arguably of the German
law.216 8OWLPDWHO\ WKH 1HZ <RUN ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ VWDWXWH ORRNHG OLNH PDQ\
ZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQODZVWKURXJKRXWWKHZRUOGDVWKH\KDGHYROYHGE\WKHHDUO\ th
century. And more importantly than how the statute seems retrospectively to a twenty-first
century observer, it undoubtedly seemed reasonable (and like good policy) to a broad
swath of contemporaneous experts. 217 7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI WKH 1HZ
211. Id.
212. Id. In 2018 dollars, $126 per month would have been the minimum benefit and $378 the maximum
benefit. The $20 maximum benefit where a maiming was involved would have been about $504 per week in
2018 dollars. This inflation conversion is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator.
213. Summary provided in U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., WORKMEN¶S COMP. STATS.,
Bulletin No. 203, supra note 6, at 151.
214. Id.
215. Compare John F. Burton, Report of the National Commission on Workmen’s Compensation Laws, 1
WORKMEN¶S COMP. L. REV   ³7KHPDLQLVVXHIRUSHUPDQHQWWRWDOdisability benefits concerns
the total sum allowed and the duration of payments. Although there is wide agreement that payments for
permanent total disability should be paid for life, we found that 19 States in 1972 failed to comply with that
recommended standard. In 15 States, duration of payments was limited to 10 years or less and in 11 States the
gross sum payable was less than $25,000, which is less than the average full-time worker in the United States
HDUQVLQIRXU\HDUV´ 
216. Workers in each country were paid for work-related medical injury care under a national health insurance
law, and at the time the Minnesota Commission and NAM investigators were doing their work England had not
yet enacted such a law. See Watts, supra note 157, at 76; see also Altenstetter, supra note 158, at 200.
217. Following the Ives decision, the New York Commission (independently of the NCF) aggressively
UHRSHQHGLWVHDUOLHULQYHVWLJDWLRQVRQWKHGHVLUDELOLW\DQGGHVLJQRIDZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQODZ$QDFFRXQW
that explains the large amount of work the Commission completed states:
The first and principal report is one of the most extended reports issued by a State commission. Eleven
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York statute (or its successors in other states) as unreasonable would have meant, as a
SUDFWLFDO PDWWHU FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI WKH YHU\ LGHD RI ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ ZLWK IHZ
alternative ideas in circulation as to how to replace the insufficient tort system.
The Washington statute upheld in Mountain Timber provided fixed monthly benefits
for both disability and death that were not based on a percentage of the average weekly
wage.218 The Arizona statute upheld in the Arizona Copper cases provided total disability
benefits based on fifty-SHUFHQWRILQMXUHGZRUNHU¶VDYHUDJHVHPLPRQWKly earnings and, in
the case of partial benefits, for only fifty-percent of injury related reduction in wages, with
a lifetime cap on all disability benefits of four-thousand dollars.219 None of the early
statutes provided work-injury medical benefits beyond sixty days. Was this an adequate
exchange for the total relinquishment of tort rights? As discussed in Part II, the Supreme
Court made no attempt to compare, in quantitative terms, the magnitude of benefits. One
might infer that anything below fifty-percent of the average wage for ongoing disability
might have been problematic for the Court. The complete absence of a death benefit might
not have passed muster under the bargain.220 The important point is that the Supreme
&RXUW¶VVLOHQFHRQWKHVFDOHRIEHQHILts speaks volumes to its likely confidence in the level
of sophistication and process that went into creation of the statutes. That sophistication
essentially obviated the need for the Court to make any pronouncements on the
importance, or constitutional status of tort rights, and whether those rights could, indeed,
simply be swept away.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps some thoughts may now safely be completed. It is unnecessary to say that a
state might (without triggering due process concerns) set aside all rules of employerHPSOR\HHOLDELOLW\ZLWKRXWSURYLGLQJD³UHDVRQDEO\MXVWVXEVWLWXWH´ because here, in the
New York workers’ compensation statute under consideration, there is a reasonably just

public hearings in various parts of the State, 14 executive sessions of the commission, and numerous
meetings of committees and subcommittees indicate something of the activity of the commission in
one direction. Inquiries were sent to 1,942 employers reporting accidents to the State department of
labor, to 975 reporting accidents to the public-service commission, and to the presidents of 2,331
labor organizations in the State. Several statistical studies were made as to the economic results of
accidents and proceedings at law with reference to such accidents; also the cost of industrial accidents
to employers and the distribution of such costs to hospitals for fees, insurance premiums, settlements,
as damages, etc.
U.S. DEP¶T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 25.
218. Id. at 876±77 (In case of death $20 per month to the surviving spouse; $5 per month to each surviving
child; maximum of $35 per month (roughly $900 in 2018 dollars). The same maximum applied to a married
injured worker with dependents. For permanent partial disability the worker could receive a maximum of $1500
(about $38,000 in 2018 dollars) regardless the duration of the disability).
219. Id. at 130 (The cap would be just over $100,000 in 2018 dollars).
220. Here, however, it should be remembered that wrongful death had been extinguished by the common law
in the English case Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808), and had to be revived in that country by
/RUG&DPSEHOO¶V$FW$OWKRXJKDOVRUHYLYHGE\VWDWXWRU\LQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKHUHLVDJRRGGHDO
of variety in the statutes. See Frederick Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 327, 329±31 (1973). It is
GLIILFXOW WR VD\ LQ JHQHUDO WHUPV ZKHWKHU ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ GHDWK EHQHILWV LQ WKH DJJUHJDWH UHSUHVHQW D
windfall or loss to the survivors of victims of work-related injuries.
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substitute.221 ³>,@WSHUKDSV PD\ EHGRXEWHGZKHWKHUWKH VWDWH FRXOGDbolish all rights of
action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up something
DGHTXDWHLQWKHLUVWHDG´but here something adequate has been set up in their stead.222
1RQHRIWKLVLVWRVD\³WKDWDQ\VFDOHRIFRPSHQVDWLRQKRZHYer insignificant, on the one
KDQGRURQHURXVRQWKHRWKHUZRXOGEHVXSSRUWDEOH´ but here one need not reach the
question because no such insignificant or onerous scale is present.223 How did the Court
know the system under consideration was reasonably just, adequate, and provided a scale
of compensation that was neither objectionably insignificant nor onerous? The Court did
not say (other than perhaps to explain how much better off employees were to be out of
the tedious, burdensome, unpredictable litigation system and to not have all the loss of an
injury fall on them).224 But it seems extremely unlikely the Court was unaware that a
massive, national conversation had been underway, during the eight years preceding
White, conducted among high-ranking business leaders, progressive groups, labor unions,
and academics, and that the statute before it was the fruit of those labors. One can perhaps
FULWLFL]HWKHHPHUJLQJZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQPRGHODVEHLQJH[FHVVLYHO\SUR-business,
and not in the interest of workers.225 That view may presume that injured workers with
valid tort claims would have sufficiently frequently prevailed under strengthening
employer liability statutes to force employers to invest in safety, ultimately also inuring to
the benefit of the victims of pure accident.226 Such a conclusion is easy to reach in
hindsight, but probably misapprehends the urgency and intensity of the work injury
problem. Despite all of this, it cannot be doubted that a compromise emerged from
significant transoceanic process, and that the Court understood this was the case.
The problem White leaves to posterity is one of unarticulated boundaries.
Boundaries for employee benefits as a substitute for tort are said to exist, but are never
delimited except by inference. A ³VXEVWDQWLDO H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKH LPSDLUPHQW RI HDUQLQJ
FDSDFLW\´ UHPDLQV LQ WKH H\H RI EHKROGHU227 Of course, as Professor Nachbar recently
emphasized, throughout the Lochner era the Court approached the question of deprivation
RI YHVWHG ULJKWV ³IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI GLYLQLQJ WKH QDWXUH RI WKH VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LQ
221. &RRSHUY'HS¶WRI/DERU ,QGus., 342 P.2d 218, 225 (Wash. 1959).
222. Id.
223. Mountain Timber Co. v. Wash., 243 U.S. 219, 241 (1917).
224. Id. at 238.
225. See Weinstein, supra note 186, DW FKDUDFWHUL]LQJVRFLDOLVWOHDGHU0RUULV+LOOTXLW¶VGHVFULSWLRQ
RIWKH1&)¶VPRGHOZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQVWDWXWH³µWKHVKUHZGHVW>JDPH@\HWGHYLVHGE\WKHHPSOR\HUVRIDQ\
FRXQWU\¶,WWRRNµQRWKLQJIURPFDSLWDO¶LWJDYHµQRWKLQJWRODERU¶%XWLWµGRHVLWDOOZLWKVXFKDQDSSHDUDQFHRI
ERXQGOHVV JHQHURVLW\¶ WKDW µVRPH RI WKH PRUH JXLOHOHVV GLSORPDWV LQ WKH ODERU PRYHPHQW DUH DFWXDOO\
RYHUZKHOPHGE\LW¶´DQGLWZDVGHYLVHGWRIRUHVWDOO³µOHJLVODWLRQZKLFKZLOOVZHHSDZD\DOOWKHGHIHQVHVRIWKe
HPSOR\HU¶´ see also Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform,”
50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 675±76 (1998) (criticizing a simplistic view of the quid pro quo and noting that, among
RWKHUWKLQJV³VRPHEXVLQHVVOHDGHUV YLHZHGZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQDVDFRPSURPLVHWKDWRIIHUHGVRPHVKRUWterm sacrifice of employer profit in exchange for longer term protection of capital from socialist organizing in
the United States, as well as protection from proposals to copy the more comprehensive German model of
disability compensation or to expand employer tort liability´ 
226. $Q³HPSOR\HUOLDELOLW\´VWDWXWHLVRQH ZKLFKDEROLVKHVFHUWDLQFRPPRQODZDIILUPDWLYHGHIHQVHV²the
fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk, or contributory negligence²to common law tort actions. See Mondou
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co, 223 U.S. 1, 49 (1912).
227. Schwedtman & Emery, supra note 159, at 265.
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UHJXODWLRQQRWWKHQDWXUHRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWVWROLEHUW\DQGSURSHUW\´QRWWRPHQWLRQ
personal security.228 Properly understood in constitutional terms, the foundational
ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRn cases decided the power of a state, as limited by the 14 th
amendment, to compel employers to provide insurance for their workers. The question of
infringement on individual employee rights was peripheral, though considered. It is
difficult to fault the Court for not precisely answering questions delineating the scope of
individual rights (in this case, the common law tort right to a remedy for personal injury
WKDW ZRUNHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ ZDV UHSODFLQJ  ZKHQ LW KDG QRW UHDOO\ EHHQ DVNHG WKRVH
questions, and had only just begun to refine a language of individual fundamental rights. 229

228. Nachbar, supra note 34, at 1641.
229. Id. at 1640±41.
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